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In this article di$erences between rational, policy-based, and rationalized voting 
are discussed, and it is argued that these forms of electoral decision making are 
not properly analyzed in existing electoral studies. Policy voting, persuasion, 
and projection are then redefined as three possible ways of restoring balance 
among imbalanced triads of political beliefs and attitudes. With the help of the 
Chernobyl nuclear plants issue it is shown that persuasion and projection are far 
more important ways of restoring balance than policy voting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has been an important assumption of certain normative democratic theo- 
ries and the rational choice perspective alike that the voting choice is rational. 
The voter, making up his mind for election day, informs himself on the important 
policy issues of the campaign, compares his own issue opinions with the opin- 
ions of the candidates (or parties) at stake, and votes for the candidate nearest to 
his own issue positions. From the beginning of electoral research, however, this 
assumption of a rational, policy-based voting decision was challenged through 
the discovery of psychological mechanisms confounding the voters' and candi- 
dates' issue opinions, which mechanisms became known under names like ration- 
alization, assimilation, contrast, projection, and persuasion. In modem voting 
research, however, these seemingly irrational processes continued to be analyzed 
in conjunction with rational voting, sustained by advanced methodology which 
made it possible to distinguish empirically the real policy voters from the "ratio- 
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nalizers." In a theoretical sense, though, the rational and irrational processes 
remained separated, each drawing its rationale from a different body of theory. 
In this article I will discuss some current models of voting behavior and their 
treatment of rational and rationalized voting. Finding these models wanting in 
theoretical coherence, I propose a psychological theory of the voting action in 
which rational and rationalized voting receive a uniform treatment. The specific 
acts of policy voting, persuasion, and projection may be analyzed as parts of 
more general processes concerning the origin, maintenance, and resolution of 
psychic conflict, which processes ultimately determine the voting action. After 
discussing these processes in terms of Heider's balance theory, I will show in a 
quasiexperiment how psychic conflicts are maintained or resolved through policy 
voting, projection, and persuasion, and how party choice is affected. Finally, 
some conclusions are drawn. 
THE RATIONAL AND THE RATIONALIZED VOTE 
In a classic article, Brody and Page (1972) outlined the differences between 
rational voting and rationalized voting. A rational, policy-based choice of a 
candidate (or party) would follow Downs's (1957) requirement that the voter first 
decides on his own position on the important political issues of the day, compares 
his issue stands to those of the available candidates, and then decides to vote for 
the candidate nearest to him on most issues; the causal chain would thus run from 
issue positions to the voting action. The rationalized vote implies a reversal of 
this causal order: the choice of the candidate influences the issue positions of the 
voter. 
Such a rationalization may occur in two forms. First, it may take the form of 
projection. The voter favors a candidate on other grounds than issue position and 
assumes that the favorite candidate agrees with him on the issues (Brody & Page, 
1972); at the same time a "reverse" projection may occur to the extent that the 
voter ascribes to a candidate, whom he already dislikes on other grounds, those 
issue positions that the voter himself rejects (Markus & Converse, 1979). 
Second, rationalization may take the form of persuasion. The voter decides 
on a candidate for other reasons than issue positions and conforms his own issue 
opinions to those of the selected candidate (Brody & Page, 1972); again a reverse 
form of persuasion may be discerned in that a voter adapts his own issue stands in 
contradiction to those of a candidate already negatively evaluated on other 
grounds (Markus & Converse, 1979). 
'Note that these processes of rationalization may also be described in terms of assimilation and 
contrast. Persuasion involves the assimilation of the issue opinions of the voter's favorite candidate 
to the voter's own positions; projection is the assimilation of the voter's own issue stands to those of 
his liked candidate. Their reversals indicate a contrasting of the voter's own issue positions to those 
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In a number of subsequent articles it was attempted to separate the rational 
voters from the rationalizers (Page & Jones, 1979; Markus & Converse, 1979; 
for a review see Niemi & Weisberg, 1984). In a methodological sense, the 
processes of projection and persuasion imply reciprocity in the causal relation- 
ships between the different factors leading to the voting choice, a reversal of the 
causal order which the different researchers capture through the specification of 
nonrecursive, simultaneous equation models. Only Markus and Converse, how- 
ever, are able to distinguish between projection and persuasion effects, through 
the use of panel data. 
While rationalizing effects thus could be modeled and shown in an empirical 
sense, much less effort was put in a theoretical explanation of these phenomena. 
Page and Jones, for example, loosely refer to the social-psychological studies on 
selective perception, as well as to rational choice theories dealing with decision 
making under conditions of incomplete information. Markus and Converse posit 
the "rational" decision rule that the voter will vote for the candidate of whom he 
expects the smallest subjective loss, and combine this rule with some non- 
specified social-psychological theories of policy voting. Nowhere, however, are 
the insights from rational choice theory or social psychology combined in one 
integrated framework; the authors typically stay close to the variables employed, 
emphasizing methodological ingenuity over theoretical coherence. 
In this article I will reverse this emphasis. First, I propose to integrate 
projection and persuasion, together with policy voting, into a social psychologi- 
cal approach to the voting action. Secondly, I will attempt to demonstrate the 
existence of rational and rationalizing voting tendencies in a relatively simple and 
straightforward quasiexperiment. 
In a psychological sense, policy voting, projection, and persuasion may be 
regarded as parts of more encompassing processes regarding the origin, mainte- 
nance, and resolution of psychic conflict. Normally the person facing the elec- 
tion holds multiple opinions and attitudes about the different elements of politics 
(issues, candidates, parties, etc.), which opinions and attitudes may be more or 
less in conflict with one another, pulling the person toward different candidates. 
The degree to which this conflict is actually experienced and the modes of 
conflict resolution that are chosen differ from person to person. We can broadly 
specify three interrelated conditions which are significant in this respect. 
The first condition refers to the degree of differentiation and integration of 
of the disliked candidate (reverse projection), or a contrasting of the issue stands of the rejected 
candidate to the voter's own positions (reverse persuasion). Although in essence referring to identi- 
cal psychic processes, the four mechanisms derive from different psychological schools: projection 
originates from the psychoanalytic study of defense mechanisms, persuasion from the Yale studies in 
communication, while assimilation and contrast come from Gestalt theory, bcing two different 
expressions of the tendency toward a "good" Gestalt in the perceptual field (KoBa,  1935, 
pp. 106ff). 
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the person's "field" of political elements. Differentiation indicates the number of 
political elements that the person recognizes, integration implies the number 
of connections which the person sees between these elements (Luskin, 1987; 
Sniderman et al., 1991). Only when the person knows or perceives that one 
element (such as a candidate) belongs to or is connected to another element (such 
as a party) is it possible for him to detect possible inconsistencies in his evalua- 
tions of those elements: a favorable attitude toward candidate X and a negative 
attitude toward that candidate's party P cannot be in conflict as long as the person 
does not recognize that X and P belong together. 
The second condition pertains to the person's actual tolerance of psychic 
conflict, which tolerance is commonly regarded as a deeper-lying property of his 
personality; it refers to the degree to which the person's orientation to the exter- 
nal environment is influenced by internal psychic forces. A person whose per- 
sonality is dominated by unresolved subconscious tensions tends to adopt a rigid 
and stereotypical view of his environment, in which there is no place for ambi- 
guity or conflict. The less tolerant of conflict the person is, the more stringent his 
attempts to reduce the conflict will become, in extreme cases bordering on the 
pathological (Adorno et al., 1950; Berelson et al.,  1954; Frenkel-Brunswik, 
1949; Festinger, 1957; Lane, 1973). 
Finally, the third condition is the degree of ambiguity inherent in the stimu- 
lus situation. For example, candidates (or parties) do not always find it advan- 
tageous to be straightforward in their issue positions, especially not in the case of 
hotly disputed issues. The less clear-cut their positions, the less their potential for 
conflict with other elements of politics (Berelson et al., 1954; Page, 1976; Page 
& Brody, 1972). 
To the degree that these conditions are operative, the person will experience 
the conflict among his opinions and attitudes as more or less unpleasant or 
painful, and consequently he will more or less attempt a resolution of the con- 
flicting forces; in other words, he will strive for consonance, balance, or congnt- 
ity among his cognitions and evaluations (Festinger, 1957; 1964; Heider, 1946; 
Rokeach, 1960). Projection, persuasion, and policy voting are to be regarded as 
three possible mechanisms through which a resolution of conflict may be 
achieved. This becomes clear once we have recast the previous discussion of 
rational versus rationalized voting in terms of Heider's balance theory. 
The Austrian-American psychologist Fritz Heider was the first to generalize 
the Gestalt principles of visual perception to the field of human behavior, con- 
ceptualizing the tendency toward "good" form that characterizes perception as a 
tendency toward balance in human relations. A person P may have a relation to 
another person 0 and to some nonpersonal entity X (thing, idea, etc.), and these 
relations may have an evaluative character (P likes 0, P hates X) and a "unit" 
character (P owns X, P causes X, 0 is proximal to X, etc.), whereby P, 0 ,  and X 
are all part of P's field (or life space). According to balance theory, a balance 
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between these three entities exists when all three relations are positive in all 
respects, or when two are negative and one is positive. "If no balanced state 
exists," Heider asserts, "then forces towards this state will arise. Either the 
dynamic characters will change, or the unit relations will be changed through 
action or through cognitive reorganization. If a change is not possible, the state 
of imbalance will produce tension" (Heider, 1946, pp. 107-108). 
Essential in balance theory is that the given whole of relations is not in a 
static condition, but that it is a momentary resultant of different forces driving in 
divergent or convergent directions. In such a dynamic system, any change in one 
part will have repercussions for the whole, and conversely the nature and func- 
tion of one part are determined by their relationship to the other parts making up 
the whole. This dynamic character also has a time aspect: a change of part X at 
time T will not only affect 0 at time T, but also P at T + 1. 
Principles of balance may be readily extended to the field of voting behav- 
ior. The processes of projection, persuasion, and policy voting then may be 
redefined as three possible ways in which the voter seeks to balance his beliefs 
and attitudes about the political world. Consider a triad consisting of voter V, 
candidate C, and issue opinion I, as in Figure 1.  Suppose further that voter V 
positively evaluates candidate C,  favors issue position I, but perceives that C 
rejects position I. This voter is in a state of imbalance, which creates tensions 
toward change among the triad's elements. We define a change in the relation 
V-I, with no changes in the other relationships, as persuasion: V adopts C's 
position on issue I. A change in the relation C-I, with no other changes in the 
triad, amounts to projection: V perceives C as adopting V's position on I. 
Another possibility, a change in the relation V-C without other changes, may be 
defined as policy voting: V changes his evaluation of C in the light of V's own 
position of I and his knowledge of C's deviating stand on I. 
The occurrence of imbalanced states, the degree to which they are resolved 
into balanced states and whether balance is achieved through persuasion, projec- 
tion, policy voting or some other change ultimately are empirical questions. In 
the next paragraph I will report on an empirical investigation of these matters, 
concerning the issue of nuclear energy. Two points have our attention here. Given 
the tendency toward balance which Heider posits, we are interested to see wheth- 
er a balanced state is actually more stable than an imbalanced one. Second, we 
wonder how changes come about in the two states, and to what extent the 
imbalanced state is altered through projection, persuasion, policy voting, or in 
some other way. 
Fig. 1 
CHERNOBYL AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 
Following the energy crisis of the mid- 1970s, in the Netherlands the question 
arose of which alternative sources of energy should be exploited instead of oil. The 
political discussion quickly centered on nuclear energy, and by 1980 the benefits and 
disadvantages of nuclear power had become a subject of a lively public debate. In 
1985 the Dutch government decided to enlarge the number of nuclear plants, after 
which decision the public interest in nuclear power diminished somewhat. The issue 
of nuclear power plants forcefully regained the public's attention, however, when on 
April 30, 1986, the newspapers carried the first news of the nuclear disaster in 
Chernobyl. Although thousands of miles away, the nuclear fallout resulting from the 
meltdown of the Russian power plant reached large parts of northwestern Europe, 
bringing home the dangers of nuclear energy to many people in a clear and 
unambiguous way. As a result, Dutch public opinion intensified its opposition to 
nuclear energy, and any extension of the number of nuclear plants ceased to be viable 
political alternative for years to come (Van Holsteyn, 1987). 
Tragic as the accident was, its timing presents us with a good case to test 
different aspects of balance theory. On May 21, 1986, the general elections for 
the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament were due, and the workgroup in 
charge of the Dutch National Election Study had just before the Chernobyl 
disaster completed its first wave of survey interviews (Van der Eijk et al., 1988). 
The interviews contained questions of the respondents' opinions about nuclear 
power plants, their perceptions of the stands of the four major parties on this 
issue, and their voting intention (see Appendix for more details). Immediately 
after the elections the second wave of interviews was carried out, again including 
the questions mentioned and the respondents' votes. 
March-April May-June 
Mean (S.D) Mean (S.D) 
Perception of VVD 
(N)
Perception of CDA 
(N)
Percption of D66 
(N)




Note: see Appendix for information on variables. N's include those respondents stating an 
intention in wave 1 to vote for one of the major four parties, PvdA (Socialists), CDA 
(Christian Democrats), VVD (Liberals) and D66 (Democrats). 
Fig. 2. nuclear issue opinions and perceptions of party positions, March-June 1986 
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In Figure 2 the sequence of events is presented schematically, together with 
the opinions of the respondents involved. It can be seen that the respondents 
move almost a full position in the "no" direction, while their opinions at the same 
time become more homogeneous. Respondents also perceive the four major 
parties as taking a more antinuclear stand, although in both waves CDA and 
VVD are consistently viewed as proponents of more nuclear power plants, and 
PvdA and D66 as opponents of these plants. 
This course of events presents us with a research set-up which comes close 
to a natural experiment without a control group (Shively, 1980): in wave 1 the 
respondents' voting intentions, nuclear issue opinions, and perceptions of party 
positions are measured, and respondents are divided in a balanced and an imbal- 
anced group; the Chernobyl accident, the electoral campaign, and the election act 
as stimuli on the respondents, presumably sharpening their awareness of possible 
imbalances among their opinions, perceptions, and voting intentions; in wave 2, 
right after the elections, all pertinent variables are measured again, and tenden- 
cies toward (im)balance can be ascertained among the two groups of voters. 
The concept of balance may be applied as follows. Consider the triad in 
Figure 1,  consisting this time of voter V, party P, and nuclear issue opinion I. A 
balanced state exists in the following cases: 
-V favors P, P favors I, and V favors I; 
-V favors P, P rejects I, and V rejects I; 
-V rejects P, P favors I, and V rejects I; 
-V rejects P, P rejects I, and V favors I. 
We speak of an imbalanced state when 
-V favors P, P rejects I, and V favors I; 
-V favors P, P favors I ,  and V rejects I; 
-V rejects P, P rejects I, and V rejects I; 
-V rejects P, P favors I, and V favors I. 
We will restrict the area of application by taking into account only those 
states of (im)balance in which V actually has a party preference P and disregard 
those states of (im)balance in which V rejects a certain party P, since with our 
survey material we can only construct states of (im)balance with the knowledge 
of a positive party choice. 
Methods 
From the 1986 National Election Study, we have used the following mate- 
rials (see Appendix for detailed information): 
The party component of the triad is operationalized in voting intention for 
CDA, PvdA, VVD, or D66 (wave 1) and actual vote (wave 2). 
The issue opinion component is operationalized from the "nuclear plants" 
questions in both waves. As a rough approximation of a positive opinion toward 
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nuclear plants we have taken scale positions 1-3; position 4 denotes a neutral 
posture, whereas positions 5-7 are held to indicate a negative o p i n i ~ n . ~  
The "unity" component is operationalized in the questions in both waves in 
which the respondents are asked to rate the four parties CDA, PvdA, VVD, and 
D66 on the same seven-point scale. A rating of a party between positions 1-3 
indicates the perception of a positive opinion toward nuclear plants, position 4 
the perception of a neutral stand, and positions 5-7 the perception of a negative 
opinion toward those plants. 
In operational terms a balanced state exists in wave 1 among voters who 
intend to vote for PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD, and whose opinions toward 
nuclear power plants are in agreement with their perception of the nuclear plant 
issue opinion of the party of their choice. An imbalanced state exists in wave 1 
among voters who intend to vote for PvdA, D66, CDA, and VVD, and whose 
opinions on nuclear plants are in disagreement with their perception of the 
nuclear issue stand of the party they want to vote for. In both states in wave 1,  
respondents holding either neutral issue positions or viewing the parties as having 
neutral issue stands are excluded. 
The different forms of change from wave 1 to wave 2 involve the following. 
A change of vote means a shift from an intention to vote for CDA, PvdA, VVD, 
or D66 to an actual vote for any other party, including the Dutch minor parties. A 
change of issue opinion indicates a shift from either a negative opinion to a 
neutral or a positive one, or from a positive opinion to a neutral or negative one. 
A change of party perception signifies a shift from a view of a party's position as 
negative to a view of that party as neutral or positive on the issue, or a shift from 
a view of a party's position as positive to a view of that party as neutral or 
negative. 
Results 
In wave 1, 571 respondents are selected; 483 of these are in a state of 
balance as defined above (85%), while 88 respondents are in a state of imbalance 
(15%). Table I indicates the changes among all respondents in the three variables 
between wave 1 and 2; in Tables I1 and 111, it can be seen how the balanced and 
imbalanced states change from wave I to 2. 
The relatively small numbers of respondents in the two groups caution 
against an overconfident interpretation of the results; therefore we will report 
>A trichotomization of the seven-point scale is consistent with Achen's observation that a respon- 
dent's genuine opinion on some issue is nor a single point, but rather a distribution of points around 
some central position on a scale: "[R]espondents will not always respond the same way to the same 
question even if their attitude remain unchanged. A subject may say 'strongly agree' one time and 
'agree' the next, simply because of the ambiguity of the question asked or because he is uncertain 
how strong is 'strongly"' (Achen, 1975, p. 1220). 
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Table I. All Voters, Wave 2 
Maintain issue opinion Change party Change issue opinion Change party 
Maintain party perception perception Maintain party perception perception Total 
Maint. vote 52% 8% 12% 18% 90% 
Change vote 5% 2% 2% 1% 10% 
Total 57% 10% 14% 19% 100% 
(N = 571) 
only on the most significant differences between the balanced and imbalanced 
groups. 
Turning to our empirical points, then, we can discern important differences 
between balanced and imbalanced voters. First, the state of balance is much 
more stable than the imbalanced one: 59% of the balanced voters in the first wave 
remain in an identical balanced state in wave 2, while only 11% of the imbal- 
anced voters in wave 1 persist in the same state of imbalance in the second wave. 
Second, changes seem to come about in different forms in the two states. In 
the balanced state the most important change occurs by voters who maintain their 
party choice, while changing their issue opinion and party perception (19%). 
This implies a shift toward a new state of balance and is consistent with the 
changes shown in Figure 2. The other changes either signify a transition to an 
imbalanced state (12%), or the establishment of new (im)balanced states through 
a change in party choice (10%). 
The changes among the imbalanced voters provide an indication of the 
relative impact of policy voting, persuasion, and projection, as defined in terms 
of balance theory. We see that most change seems to come about through persua- 
sion: a change in issue opinion while maintaining voting choice and issue percep- 
tion of the preferred party (38%). The second important form of change runs 
through projection: a change of party perception, with no altering of vote or issue 
opinion (27%). The third, policy-based resolution, a change of party vote while 
keeping one's issue opinion and party perception, is obtained by only 2% of the 
imbalanced voters. Besides that, 11% of the imbalanced voters remain in this 
state, while 9% change to a new state of imbalance. Finally, 13% shift to a new 
state of (im)balance through a change of party preference. 
Table 11. Balanced Voters, Wave 2 
Maintain issue opinion Change party Change issue opinion Change party 
Maintain party perception perception Maintain party perception perception Total 
Maint. vote 59% 5% 
Change vote 5% 2% 
Total 64% 7% 
(N = 483) 
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Table HI. Imbalanced Voters, Wave 2 
Maintain issue opinion Change party Change issue opinion Change party 
Maintain party perception perception Maintain party perception perception Total 
Maint. vote 11% 27% 38% 
Change vote 2% 4% 8 4  
Total 13% 31% 46% 10% 100% 
(N = 88) 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article I have discussed the differences between rational and ration- 
alized voting, and I have argued that these forms of electoral decision making 
have not been properly analyzed within one consistent theoretical framework. I 
adopted a social psychological approach to the voting action, which was elabo- 
rated in Heider's balance theory. I was also able to select an actual "hot issue" 
and to test its impact on the vote under quasiexperimental conditions. 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that the issue of nuclear power, force- 
fully brought to the attention of the electorate just before the start of the election 
campaign, does not seem to have had much influence upon the vote. The margin- 
als of Table I show that, whereas one-third of the electorate changes its opinion 
on nuclear plants, and seven out of ten voters alter their perceptions of the major 
parties, only 10%deviate from their stated voting intention. Insofar as the Cher- 
nobyl accident has made an impact, it has not had one on the 1986 Dutch vote. 
A second conclusion is that in this case persuasion and projection seem far 
more important means of conflict resolution than policy voting, which is remark- 
able given the high saliency of the issue involved. Our current results thus seem 
to provide little support for a Downsian, issue-oriented treatment of the vote, yet 
a definite conclusion on this matter must, of course, be postponed until these 
findings are repeated for other issues and tested under different conditions. 
Further it may be argued that our approach constitutes a theoretical im- 
provement over existing approaches. Instead of a collection of variables, loosely 
held together by some idiosyncratic combination of rational choice and social 
psychological perspectives, I have posited a psychological model of the voting 
action, in which persuasion, projection, and policy voting are redefined as modes 
of resolution of psychic conflict. For research purposes, this model may be easily 
extended to other factors influencing the voting decision, such as L-R ideology 
and party leaders. In a theoretical sense, the model attempts to synthesize differ- 
ent psychological currents which have emerged in recent and older electoral 
research (for a review see Visser, 1994). 
Finally, it has been contended that, since most voters view the political 
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world with little interest and involvement, they will in fact tolerate a great deal of 
imbalance among their political cognitions and evaluations. Our figures show 
that this is by and large not the case. In the first wave the number of balanced 
voters outweighs the imbalanced ones by a ratio of six to one. In the second wave 
the balanced state seems to be maintained much better than the imbalanced state; 
further, two out of every three imbalanced voters shift to a state of balance. The 
voter probably may not be rational, but this does not mean that his ideas and 
opinions about the political world are disorganized; it is only that the mode of 
their organization conforms more to psycho-logical than to formal logical re- 
quirements. 
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APPENDIX: DATA AND VARIABLES 
The data for this paper originate from the Dutch National Election Studies 
(NES), large nationwide surveys held under the auspices of an interuniversity 
workgroup at every parliamentary election since 1971. Selected was the NES of 
1986. The following variables have been used: 
*Voting intention 
*Party voted for in most recent election 
*Perceptions of the positions of CDA, PvdA, VVD and D66 on the nuclear 
power plants issue, measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (more 
nuclear plants) to 7 (no nuclear plants) 
*Respondent's preference on the nuclear power plants issue, measured on a 
seven-point scale ranging from 1 (more nuclear plants) to 7 (no nuclear 
plants) 
The NES 1986 consisted of two waves of interviews: the preelection wave 
in March-April 1986, and the postelection wave immediately after the 1986 
election, in May-June. Table IV indicates to which wave the different variables 
employed in this paper belong; the variable numbers refer to the numbers used in 
the codebooks, in which further information can be found (Van der Eijk et al., 
Table IV. NES Variables, 1986 
Variable Wave 1 Wave 2 
Voting intention V053 
Party voted for, etc. V181 
Nuclear plants perception of CDA V039 V215 
Nuclear plants perception of PvdA V040 V216 
Nuclear plants perception of VVD V04 1 V217 
Nuclear plants perception of D66 V042 V218 
Nuclear plants respondent's preference V043 V219 
1988). Finally, note that the original collectors of the data do not bear any 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations published in this paper. 
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